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Abstract 
The idea of fully accepting statements when 
the evidence has rendered them probable 
enough faces a number of difficulties. We 
leave the interpretation of probability largely 
open, but attempt to suggest a contextual ap­
proach to full belief. We show that the dif­
ficulties of probabilistic acceptance are not 
as severe as they are sometimes painted, 
and that though there are oddities associ­
ated with probabilistic acceptance they are 
in some instances less awkward than the dif­
ficulties associated with other nonmonotonic 
formalisms. We show that the structure at 
which we arrive provides a natural home for 
statistical inference. 
1 Introduction. 
You and I often jump to conclusions that are not 
strictly (deductively) entailed by the evidence and 
background knowledge we have available. In doing 
so, we are not always acting irrationally. An alter­
native would be to assign to each proposition the de­
gree of belief less than unity that is appropriate, in the 
light of the evidence, but life is too short to calculate 
these degrees of belief, even if they exist. Many writ­
ers, therefore, have been led to consider nonmonotonic 
inference: inference that goes beyond deduction, but 
suffers the drawback of occasionally leading to false­
hood from true premises. For present purposes we 
skip the important debate between "probabilists" and 
"logicists" and simply observe that many people take 
the human propensity to jump to conclusions to be 
a potentially valuable ingredient of artificial cognitive 
systems. It is this conviction that has driven the de­
velopment of such non monotonic systems as autoepis-
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temic logic [Moore, 1985], default logic [Reiter, 1980], 
theorist [Poole, 1991], defeasible logic [Pollock, 1987; 
Loui, 100 106], circumscription [McCarthy, 1980], and 
many others. 
One natural gloss on nonmonotonic or uncertain infer­
ence is to say that we accept what is probable. It is 
well known that this can't work. Our main purpose 
here is to show that this particular bit of folk wisdom 
- that acceptance on the basis of probability cannot 
be taken as the foundation of uncertain inference - is 
mistaken. 
2 Preliminaries 
To make this thesis more precise requires getting 
clearer about what we mean by acceptance, what we 
mean by probability, and what we can reasonably de­
mand of a system of uncertain inference. 
We can be quite general about probability. We need 
only require that it be a function whose domain in­
cludes closed sentences of our language and whose 
range, whether it be real numbers, intervals of reals, 
sets of reals, or fuzzy sets of reals, be such that the 
idea of a real-valued threshold makes sense:P(S) ?: t. 
If P(S) is an interval or a set of reals, then P(S) ?: t 
means that the lower bound of P(S) is greater than t. 
In particular, in interpreting probability, we can leave 
open the question of whether all probabilities are "ulti­
mately" based on objective statistics (as we believe) or 
whether some or all probabilities are essentially sub­
jective in character. (Note that we cannot identify 
probability with frequency. To do so would require 
that we take the probability of heads on the next toss 
to be 0 or 1, since there is only one next toss and it 
either yield:; heads or it does not; no other frequencies 
are admissible.) 
The idea of acceptance requires somewhat more de­
tailed consideration. Clearly we intend it to be tenta­
tive, or nonmonotonic. On the other hand, acceptance 
must be distinguished from merely having a certain 
degree of belief. One suggestion [Braithwaite, 1946] is 
that to accept a proposition is to be prepared to act on 
the basis of its truth, as opposed to being prepared to 
bet on its truth. This doesn't seem quite right, since 
given any proposition, it is usually possible to conjure 
up bizarre circumstances under which one would not 
be prepared to act as if it were true !Levi and Mor­
genbesser, 1964]. 
A more reasonable idea is to construe acceptance as 
somewhat context relative. That is, when we talk of 
acceptance we have in mind some range of circum­
stances (e.g., planning a trip by public transportation; 
deciding which of a certain limited set of acts to per­
form on the basis of one or another possible body of 
evidence; etc.) within which an accepted proposition 
is to be regarded as true . Another way to put this is 
to say that within this range of circumstances, we do 
not take an accepted proposition as a suitable matter 
for a bet [Kyburg, 1988]. 
For example, suppose that in the decisions you face in a 
certain class of circumstances the ratio of costs to ben­
efits always lies between 1 : 3 and 3 : 1. In this class of 
circumstances there is no difference between a proba­
bility of 0. 75 and a probability of 1.0, and no difference 
between a probability of 0.25 and a probability of 0.0. 
Even holding the class of circumstances constant, how­
ever, acceptance is nonmonotonic. Given evidence E, 
the proposition S may be acceptable relative to the 
class C of circumstances. We act as if S is true. There 
are no odds we can encounter in C that would lead 
us to bet against S. But when E is enlarged by the 
addition of new information F, to yield total evidence 
E U F, then S may no longer be accepted, even in C: 
we will no longer act as if S is true in C; we may find 
circumstances in C in which we would bet against S, 
etc. 
This view of acceptance fits in reasonably well with 
the approach of nonmonotonic logic. When you know 
of Tweety only that she is a bird, you act as if that 
were true: you put a top on the cage, you don't -
in ordinary contexts- bet that Tweety can't fly, etc. 
"Ordinary contexts": if some shifty-eyed character si­
dles up to you and offers to bet two to one that Tweety 
can't fly, you take that as relevant evidence that there 
is something going on that you don't know about. Sim­
ilarly, if you don't know that you have a brother, you 
go ahead and act as if you don't, and you don't en­
tertain bets about the matter. But it is not hard to 
imagine circumstances that would lead you to assign a 
degree of belief to that proposition rather than simply 
accepting it. 
The upshot is that if the uncertainty is low enough, it is 
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reasonable to act "on the basis of practical certainty" 
and to avoid the calculation of expected utility. On 
the other hand, if our uncertainty is not negl igible, 
our action should be based on expected utility, and 
the "probabilities" that give rise to the expectation 
should be based on approximate frequencies of which 
we are "practically certain." In either case, there is a 
role for practical certainty in action. 
3 Difficulties with Probabilistic 
Acceptance. 
As natural as high probability is as a ground for tenta­
tive acceptance, probabilistic acceptance has received 
a lot of bad press. It has generally been dismissed as a 
ground of acceptance in the nonmonotonic world (ex­
cept when "high" is taken to mean arbitrarily close to 
1.0 [Adams, 1986; Geffner and Pearl, 1990].) This has 
been so for a number of reasons. 
3.1 The Lack of Statistics. 
Ever since the influential paper by Hayes and Mc­
Carthy [McCarthy and Hayes, 1969], it has been 
claimed that there are many natural instances of non­
m onotonic inference that cannot be a matter of proba­
bility, "since the required statistical data are not avail­
able to the agent." Others have voiced similar argu­
ments. 
These arguments fail to hold water for two quite dif­
ferent reasons : some people hold that not all (or even 
no) probabilities need be based on statistical knowl­
edge ; and the problem of choosing the right reference 
class, when statistics are available is not as simple as 
these arguments suppose. 
3.1.1 Subjective Probability. 
Recall that we left the interpretation of probability 
quite open - in particular we left open the possibility 
that not all prr:;babilities need be based on statistical 
evidence. This means that, if we interpret probabili­
ties as subjective, we can simply say that whenever, 
intuitively, th.: agent is entitled to infer S from total 
evidence T, we are free to claim that the inference is 
warranted exactly because the agent is entitled to take 
the conditional probability of S given T to be high. 
A number of writers [Pearl, 1992; Adams, 1986; 
Geffner and Pearl, 1990] have followed this line, but 
usually with the constraint that to justify acceptance, 
the conditional probability of S given T must be arbi­
trarily close to 1.0. 
Few who adopt the currency of subjective probability 
are willing to squander it on acceptance, however. If 
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belief comes in degrees, then perhaps we can explain all 
our rational decisions and actions in terms of degrees 
of belief that are Jess than the 1.0 that would charac­
terize statements whose truth we have accepted. We 
need merely single out a class of statements to which 
we can assign probabilities of 1.0 on the basis of "ob­
servation" and take the correct epistemic attitude to­
ward any statement to be its conditional probability, 
where the condition is our total observational knowl­
edge. There are difficulties with this position (not the 
least of which is the problematic character of the term 
"observation") but for present purposes we leave this 
dispute to one side and assume that we need to make 
sense of acceptance for statements with probabilities 
Jess than 1.0. 
3.1.2 Statistical Knowledge. 
Generally, however, the force of the argument that 
many of the conclusions that we want to accept non­
monotonically cannot be based on probability, depends 
on the implicit assumption that probabilities are to 
be based on statistical knowledge. From our point of 
view, this is a pretty plausible assumption. The objec­
tion is nevertheless off base, because there are so many 
sources of statistical knowledge, and there is more than 
one way in which a probability can be "based on" sta­
tistical knowledge. 
1. We may have gathered the statistics of a large 
sample and inferred that they are characteristic 
of a population, of which the instance at hand is 
a member. 
2. Some other dependable person may have gathered 
the data and reported it to us. 
3. Some other dependable person may have inferred, 
from data gathered by yet other people, that a 
certain statistical generalization holds, and that 
person may have reported the statistical general­
ization to us. 
4. The statistical generalization may be derived from 
other generalizations that in turn we obtain from 
reliable informants. 
Note that in the last case particularly the generaliza­
tion need not - and maybe cannot - be construed as 
representing a frequency in our world, much Jess as a 
direct generalization from an observable frequency in 
our world. It may represent a propensity in a possible 
world, or over a collection of possible worlds. 
Furthermore, we should take a closer look at the sen­
tences whose probabilities concern us. They may be of 
a form that leads quite directly to a statistic, such as 
the probability of "the next toss of this coin will land 
heads," where the coin is otherwise unspecified. We 
could imagine having a large store of data concerning 
t his coin. But the sentences at issue may concern ob­
jects that are specified more precisely, such as "the 
next toss of this freshly minted, never-been-tossed, 
immediately-after-to-be-destroyed coin will land heads 
on its one and only toss." By its very characterization 
we cannot have a body of statistical data representing 
tosses of that coin. 
Obviously, there are many ways of tying the next toss 
of that special coin to the reported and experimental 
history of coin tosses in general. One way is simply 
to point out that, epistemically, the toss described is, 
like the first toss, merely the toss of a coin [Kyburg, 
1961]. Another approach would be to infer from the 
general statistical character of coin tosses, that in a 
possible world in which this coin were often tossed (as 
opposed to this world, in which it is tossed but once), 
it would land heads about half the time, and then use 
that counterfactual but justified claim to justify the 
assertion that the probability of heads on the unique 
toss of the specified coin is a half. 
In general there are many ways of tying an event to 
a sequence of events whose stochastic properties are 
directly or indirectly known. The problem of fixing 
on a single way is the problem of the reference class 
[Kyburg, 1983]. We cannot pretend that this problem 
has been definitively solved, but it is quite clear that 
until it is, it is premature to claim that there is a lack 
of statistics relevant to any given sentence. 
3.2 Inconsistency. 
A more interesting- and also more problematic- is­
sue concerns consistency. The "lottery paradox" [Ky­
burg, 1961] shows that however demanding we make 
the threshold for probabilistic acceptance, inconsis­
tency threatens. The story runs as follows. Choose 
any high degree of probability - say 1 - t - as a suf­
ficiently high degree of probability for acceptance (for 
the class of contexts with which we are concerned.) 
Now imagine a lottery with fl/tl tickets. Put what 
conditions you will on the lottery to ensure that it is 
fair, and suppose that it is reasonable for us to accept 
those conditions. Then the probability that a specified 
ticket (say ticket #139076) will lose is 1- [P/tl]-1. 
But this is at least as large as 1-t, and so we should be 
entitled to accept, on grounds of high probability, the 
proposition that ticket #139076 w ill lose. Exactly the 
same argument will hold for any other ticket. Com­
bined with the most obvious fairness constraint, that 
at least one ticket will win ,  these f1/ t l statements are 
inconsistent. 
A number of responses to this oddity have been pro­
posed. Most of them have taken the form of holding 
to the demand that the set of statements we accept be 
consistent, and adding conditions to the probabilistic 
acceptance rule in order to ensure that this demand is 
satisfied. 
Keith Lehrer [Lehrer, 1 975] proposed that we ensure 
consistency by allowing the acceptance of a high proba­
bility sentence S only when its probabil ity is positively 
higher than that of any alternative. Thus a probability 
of 1 - E is sufficient for acceptance only if it is higher 
than the probability of any sentence contrary to S. 
T his has some odd consequences. Consider a biased 
lottery, in which each of the N tickets has a slightly 
different probability of being the winner. Without loss 
of generality, suppose that the probability of the ith 
ticket is less than that of the i + 1st. Then we can be 
sure that the first ticket will lose. Accepting that the 
first ticket will lose, we can be sure that the second 
ticket will lose. Accepting that the second ticket will 
lose, .. . . , we can finally be sure that the every ticket 
but the Nth ticket will lose, and thus that the Nth 
ticket will win. We have preserved consistency, but 
only with a loss of generality (we can no longer deal 
with the equiprobable case) and at a cost of implau­
sibility: the probability that the Nth ticket will win 
may be extremely low; yet we may accept it! 
John Pollock [Pollock, 1990] offers a different solution. 
Like Lehrer, he thinks we should not accept any of 
the statements of the form ticket i will lose in the fair 
lottery. But he locates the trouble in stochastic de­
pendence. That ticket i loses increases the probability 
that ticket j will win. Pollock therefore draws a dis­
tinction between the paradox of the preface [Makin­
son, 1965] and the lottery paradox. But as Goodwin 
and Neufeld have shown [Goodwin and Neufeld, 1996], 
many State and Provincial lotteries have a structure 
that supports a lottery paradox argument despite in­
dependence of the tickets. The distinction between the 
lottery and the preface doesn't do what Pollock wants 
it to do. 
Isaac Levi [Levi, 1967] adopts principles that assure 
that both high probability and consistency are assured. 
But the requirement of consistency is built quite di­
rectly into his acceptance rules. 
One simple possibility is to accept statements whose 
probabilities are high, so long as they do not introduce 
inconsistency. This makes the set of statements that 
are accepted depend on the order in which statements 
are considered . If we start with ticket #1, then we 
can accept the claim that it will lose; but if ticket #1 
is considered last, then we cannot accept that claim. 
Note that in the case of the classical lottery, the set of 
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statements accepted, for a given ordering of the lottery 
tickets, will constitute a complete description of the 
outcome of the lottery: of each of the tickets but one, 
we will accept that the ticket loses; and of the last 
ticket, in virtue of the fact that we can accept that at 
least one ticket wins, we will be sure that it wins. 
Teng [Teng, 1 996b] provides a treatment that avoids 
this problem by taking account of the accepted state­
ments in computing the probability of a given state­
ment. Thus we accept the statement that ticket i will 
not win. Then we accept the statement that ticket j 
will not win only if the probability that ticket j will 
lose, given that ticket i loses, is over the threshold. 
This amounts to adopting the same fixed point idea 
that inspires default logic: We accept what is proba­
ble relative to what we have accepted. This procedure 




In a number of these treatments, particularly in the 
last two, we see a problem that is called in default 
logic the problem of multiple extensions. What you 
can accept, what you can believe, depends on the order 
in which you consider the candidates for belief. If all 
extensions are to be taken conjunctively, then of course 
we are back in the world of inconsistency. If they are 
to be taken disjunctively, then, at least in the example 
of the lottery, we are back in the world of evidence: we 
have not allowed ourselves to make any nonmonotonic 
inferences at all! 
4 Embracing the Absurd. 
There are a number of formalisms [Priest et al., 1989a; 
Priest, 1989; da Costa, 1974; da Costa et al., 1990; 
Priest et al., 1989b; Rescher and Brandom, 1979; 
Schotch and Jennings, 1989] in which to accept a set 
of inconsistent premises is not a total disaster. Many 
of these formalisms are focused on more difficult and 
deeper problems than face us in making sense of prob­
abilistic acceptance. 
4.1 Strong and Weak Inconsistency. 
There are two senses that may be given to inconsis­
tency. In the strong sense, my beliefs, the set of propo­
sitions that I fully accept, are inconsistent when there 
is a self-contrad\ctory statement among them: a state­
ment of the form S 1\ -S. I am guilty of this when I 
assert in the same breath that it is raining and that it 
is not raining. As this example shows, it is possible to 
make sense of such assertions, and some of the writers 
mentioned attempt to do just this. ("In a sense it is 
raining, but in another sense it isn't.") 
For our purposes this strong form of inconsistency can 
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be disregarded. It can (surely) never be the case that 
the statement SA -.S is highly probable. 
The sense of inconsistency that threatens to follow 
from probabilistic acceptance is much weaker than 
this. Inconsistency in this weak sense characterizes a 
set of statements that entails a contradiction, a set of 
statements that admits of no model. Probabilistic ac­
ceptance, it is clear, only leads to inconsistent beliefs in 
this weak sense. Furthermore, reflection suggests that 
this is not altogether surprising. Consider any large 
database. It is easy enough to ensure that no explicit 
contradiction is directly entered into it; it is quite an­
other matter to ensure that the entire set of entries 
is perfectly consistent. Consider your own personal 
body of knowledge. Are you quite sure that within it 
lurks no set of statements that is jointly unsatisfiable? 
Or, finally, consider scientific measurement. We can 
be sure of each measurement that it is accurate within 
three standard deviations. We can be equally sure that 
a thousand or so will contain at least one measurement 
that is not accurate within three standard deviations. 
W hat can we do about such inconsistencies? The stan­
dard response is to root them out. When you find an 
inconsistency in a database, you attempt to find the 
guilty entry; when you find yourself caught in an in­
consistency, you try to find its source and expunge it; 
... but this doesn't seem to apply to the interesting and 
valuable case of measurement : often you can't settle 
on any particular measurement to reject. 
Let us focus on inconsistent bodies of statements in 
somewhat more detail. 
4.2 Finer Distinctions. 
First let us note that absent strong inconsistency, we 
face no difficulties in adding to an inconsistent set 
of statement logical consequences of each particular 
member of that set. That is, if S is a member of the 
set of accepted statements, and S entails T, then we 
are no worse off than we were before if we add T to 
the set of statements. Furthermore, if the set of state­
ments is the result of probabilistic acceptance, T is 
already there: 
Theorem 1 If S is the set of statements whose prob­
ability is greater than 1 - t, T E S, and T f--- W, then 
WES. 
We are thus perfectly free to apply logic to single state­
ments in S; we won't get anything that is not also 
justified probabilistically. How about using more than 
one premise? Suppose our level of acceptance is 1 - t. 
Then any statement entailed by k premises will also be 
entailed by the conjunction of the k premises, and must 
therefore be as probable as that conjunction . But the 
probability of the conjunction of k statements whose 
probabilities ex�Ceed 1 - t is at least 1 - kt:.. 
Theorem 2 If P(A;) � 1 - t:. for 1 :5 < k, then 
P(A1 A A2A . . . A Ak) � 1 - ke. 
Proof. P(A1 A A2 A . . . A Ak) = 1 - P(A1 V A2 v ... v 
Ak)· But P(� v A2 v . . . v A1,:) :5 I: P(A;), so that 
P(A1 1\ A2 1\ . . . A Ak) � 1 - kt:.. (Note that we are 
making no assumptions about independence.) • 
It is a corollary of this theorem that it takes II/ E l 
premises to derive a contradiction (or even a sentence 
whose probability is 0!) from a set of sentences ac­
cepted on the basis of high probability 1 - t. 
There is thus a close connection between conjunctive 
closure and deductive closure. We can accept at the 
level 1 - kc the conjunction of any k sentences we ac­
cept at the level -e. We can accept at the level1-h 
the deductive consequences of any k premises we can 
accept at the l - e level. 
4.3 Deductive Closure 
We may take advantage of a limited amount of deduc­
tive closure within sets of statements accepted on the 
basis of high probability, even though these sets are 
weakly inconsistent. We may accept the logical con­
sequences of any single statement that is accepted; by 
reducing the acceptance level to 1 - ke we may take 
account of the consequences of k acceptable premises. 
How has inference been circumscribed in the world 
of paraconsistent logic, where inconsistent sets of 
premises are also taken seriously? One view consid­
ers the closures of maximal consistent subsets of the 
inconsistent set S[Schotch and Jennings, 1989]. The 
"degree of inconsistency" of a set of statements is in­
dicated by the number of maximal consistent subsets 
it takes to cavture all the statements of S. In the 
case of an n-ticket lottery, for example, there are n 
maximal consistent subsets, each corresponding to a 
detailed scenario of the outcome of the lottery. The 
logical closure of a maximal consistent subsets of S 
corresponds quite straight-forwardly to an extensions 
of nonmonotonic logic. 
Of course, while these logical closures are consistent, 
they are also pretty far fetched: they correspond to 
improbable stories. The same may be true of the ex­
tensions of nonmonotonic logic. This doesn't make 
them totally useless: they represent the way things 
could be, and that may be worth taking account of. It 
is not the same, however, as taking something, tenta­
tively, to be the case, in the sense that you could act 
on it. 
In [Kyburg, 1974] bodies of knowledge were allowed to 
be inconsistent and deductively closed maximal consis­
tent subsets of these bodies of knowledge were used as 
an auxiliary construction for defining randomness and, 
subsequently, probability. But there was no sugges­
tion that strands, as these constructions were called, 
served any other important epistemic purpose. They 
were not, for example, to be construed as comprising 
a set of practical certainties. 
5 Classical Statistics and Acceptance. 
Classical statistical inference takes as its fundamen­
tal mechanism the rejection of a statistical hypothe­
sis under certain prespecified conditions. Although in 
classical statistics probability is emphatically identi­
fied with frequencies [Neyman, 1950], or the concep­
tual counterparts of frequencies [Cramer, 1951], or set 
measures in a sample space [Lindgren, 1976], and al­
though many statisticians strongly deny that "reject­
ing" H amounts to "accepting" -.I-/, much of classi­
cal statistics translates smoothly into the formalism 
of purely probabilistic acceptance. Furthermore, since 
statistical knowledge is both uncertain, and central to 
the application of classical decision theory, this repre­
sents an important tie between the use of probabilities 
in decision, and the importance of non monotonic infer­
ence in setting the parameters within which decision 
theory operates . 
The core of classical statistical testing is this [Fisher, 
1956]: Suppose that His a statistical hypothesis, and 
that F is a set of possible results of observations. Un­
der suitable circumstances we can find a region R in 
S such that if the hypothesis is true, then we will 
falsely reject H only rarely by adopting the rule that 
we should reject H just in case we make an observa­
tion faling in R. The general idea is that the test has 
the long run property that if it is applied it will lead to 
false rejection with a frequency less than €. There are 
more complicated situations that can be considered, 
(choosing between two classes of hypotheses, for exam­
ple) and more complicated tests that can be analyzed 
(for example mixed tests in which the rejection of a 
hypothesis depends not only on the evidence, but also 
on the outcome of a "chance event") but the essence 
of the classical view can be captured by a simple test. 
When the statistician has found a test with "nice" long 
run properties, he is done. The next step is a practical 
one: we draw the sample, obtain an element s of F, 
and discover that in fact it is in the rejection region 
R of F. It is at this point that we go beyond what 
is classically permitted. We are permitted to say we 
obtained a sample falling into R, and that R has such 
and such nice properties. We are not permitted to say 
Probabilistic Acceptance 331 
that, relative to this evidence, the probability that H 
is false is less than €. As Birnbaum [Birnbaum, 1969] 
has pointed out, it is easy to avoid saying this, but it 
is very hard not to think it. 
There are some cautions, however. There is a gap be­
tween a long run frequency and epistemic probability. 
An event (taking a sample and having it fall in R) can 
fall into many classes about which we have some fre­
quentistic knowledge. We must choose the right such 
class, and our epistemic probability must be deter­
mined by what we know about that class. There are 
cases - for example such cases arise in epidemiology 
- where determining this class can be controversial. 
What is involved here is the problem of choosing the 
right reference class, a knotty and unsolved problem 
that has only begun to be explored [Kyburg, 1983]. 
Furthermore we must take account of the niceties of 
negation. While the statistician is perfectly correct in 
pointing out that to fail to reject a hypothesis is not 
at all the same as to accept the hypothesis, rejecting 
a hypothesis and accepting its negation may amount 
to different things because we may be thinking, for 
example, of a particular alternative to that hypothesis 
rather than its bare logical negation. 
Leaving to one side these niceties, and speaking as 
ordinary scientists, we do accept the negations of hy­
potheses rejected at the .01 level - corresponding to 
the outcome of tests that will lead to false rejection no 
more than 1% of the time. 
Let us now reflect on a sequence of such tests. To 
fix our ideas, suppose there are two, leading me to 
reject H at the .01 level, and to reject K at the .01 
level. If rejecting H is accepting -.H and rejecting K is 
accepting -.K, then what should our epistemic stance 
toward -.H 1\ -.K be? Surely we should not be quite 
so confident in rejecting both H and K as we are in 
rejecting each of them separately. 
Our previous considerations suggest that "full belief' 
in the conjunction should be characterized by 1 - .02 
rather than 1 - .01. The ratio of costs to benefits that 
result from acting on the assumption of -,H may range 
from 1:100 to 100:1; the ratio of costs to benefits that 
result from acting on the assumption of -.H 1\ -.K is 
restricted to the range 1:50 to 50:1. Any deductive 
consequence of the conjunction of -.H and -.K should 
also be taken to be supported to a smaller degree than 
either -.H or -.K. If the two hypotheses are inde­
pendent then the support for the conjunction of the 
negations is 1- .02 + .0001 = (1- .01)2; note that we 
do not gain very much from independence. 
This brief discussion is not intended to do more than 
hint at connections between nonmonotonic inference 
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and classical statistical inference. The point is that 
some of the same issues arise. 
Bayesian statistical inference is different. As we al­
ready pointed out, in principle the Bayesian can incor­
porate the uncertainty distributions associated with 
the relevant statistical hypotheses into the probabilis­
tic considerations peculiar to a specific decision con­
text. There is, however, a computational cost involved. 
For present purposes, we have chosen to stand aside 
from the Bayesian/non-Bayesian debate. (See [Cheese­
man, 1988] and [Kyburg, 1994 ].) 
6 Problems and Questions 
We are left with a number of important questions. 
1. Assuming that acceptance is useful on some occa­
sions, it remains to be seen whether purely prob­
abilistic acceptance, as outlined here, is as useful 
as other forms of nonmonotonic acceptance. At 
the very least, it seems to call attention to issues 
that should be faced by any nonmonotonic logic: 
especially, the issue of what epistemic stance we 
should adopt toward distinct extensions of the 
same nonmonotonic base. 
2. Assuming that there are occasions where rules 
leading to acceptance are useful, can we char­
acterize those occasions succinctly? Are there 
situations that call for a specific nonmonotonic 
mechanism and others that call for other mech­
anisms? In view of the interreduction of various 
approaches to nonmonotonic inference, it seems 
intuitively unlikely that there are important dif­
ferences where one logic rather than another is 
called for. 
3. If there are occasions where purely probabilistic 
rules of acceptance serve an important function, 
can we find ways of characterizing these occa­
sions? 
4. What is the relation between probabilistic accep­
tance rules and the decision-theoretic approach. 
Are there situations in which they come into con­
flict? 
5. Can we exhibit real (and not merely realistic) 
cases in which combining acceptance and proba­
bility leads to significant savings in computational 
cost or a serious improvement in performance? It 
would be interesting to look at cases complicated 
enough that we can't "see" the answer, but simple 
enough that we could run comparisons between a 
system that makes use of tentative acceptance, 
and a purely probabilistic system, if that is pos­
sible. 
6. Statistical knowledge is clearly central to any form 
of decision making. This is just the sort of knowl­
edge that we should be able to incorporate non­
monotonically into our bodies of knowledge. Thus 
our nonmonotonic handbook had better include 
some chapters on statistical inference. This in 
turn requires our giving statistics a closer exami­
nation, and an examination of a different charac­
ter, than has been our wont in AI. 
7. There have to be some rules about probability 
functions. Common sense does NOT endorse ar­
bitrary probability functions. The relation among 
statistical inference, evidence, and probability dis­
tributions is complex and needs investigation. 
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